Gosh, two days ago it was 07/08/09? Was it not two years ago that Boeing rolled out the Potemkin airliner? Talk about 'pulling wool' over our eyes.
When will Boeing step up and be honest about what is going on with this plane? At this point and time, how can we believe what we hear from them? Do the powers that be speak with a forked tongue or do they just not understand? Or, is it just bad culture?
flightblogger has a recap and commentary to which this blog will respond with additional content.
Expect another poll series the next few days: Poll1, ..., Poll6
Friday, July 10, 2009
Monday, July 6, 2009
Canadian banks
All the digression into engineering issues cannot be sustained without a break to look at what's going on in the money world.
The USA Today had an article that exclaimed how the Canadian banks (yes, our northern neighbors) did not have the meltdown seen here in the good old US of A. Well, they didn't run off after ridiculous leveraging schemes (reminder, farming out is a type of leveraging). Too, they were suspect of those who wanted us all to think that toxic securities were manna from heaven (reminder, parallel here with hype over hypothesis).
Perhaps, it's that cold air up there that keeps them sane. New York must not freeze enough to rid us of the pests (eternal noise from the best and brightest).
Hey! Isn't Chicago cold, yet we see (Cramming for the exam, Rush job, A new game (risky business), ..., Out on the limb, ...)?
The USA Today had an article that exclaimed how the Canadian banks (yes, our northern neighbors) did not have the meltdown seen here in the good old US of A. Well, they didn't run off after ridiculous leveraging schemes (reminder, farming out is a type of leveraging). Too, they were suspect of those who wanted us all to think that toxic securities were manna from heaven (reminder, parallel here with hype over hypothesis).
Perhaps, it's that cold air up there that keeps them sane. New York must not freeze enough to rid us of the pests (eternal noise from the best and brightest).
Hey! Isn't Chicago cold, yet we see (Cramming for the exam, Rush job, A new game (risky business), ..., Out on the limb, ...)?
Sunday, July 5, 2009
Scale up versus extrapolation
Aviation Week (AW) covered the recent problem discovery and reported an element of surprise.
No, folks, this was predictable from the beginning as shown by entries (see #2, #4 and more) in this blog; one main issue deals with quasi-empiricism.
First of all, in the AW article, an engineering professor is quoted as saying that Boeing did it backward. Usually, one starts small and then scales up (remember this important concept, as we'll cover it more thoroughly). That is, one enlarges from a small basis. You know, there is an adage: don't bite off more than one can chew.
The concept is applied a lot in modeling. In fact, software vendors always worry about scale up, in many ways, such as logic, throughput and more (very many ways).
The professor expressed some surprise that Boeing had extrapolated so much from a limited basis of knowledge. You see, not only were there relaxations along many axes in the product and process spaces, the program jumped to a maximum without prototyping. Why? Well, the computer was the magic key (computerism).
Now, the article says that some claim that the software involved (meaning CAE) is not suspect. No, the article says, it was the data and model that were. According to those that know, including a quoted expert.
Well, the blogger has no inside information on the particular project but speaks from experience related to this type of modeling. The software, and its underlying philosophical framework, are always to be suspect. Why? There is no grand theory to support these things to the level that we have been led to believe.
Ah, folks, it is a very un-insightful viewpoint for an engineering company to not know the limits of mathematics and software. But, the view is probably the one to be expected to be held by a gaming generation, that is until they bump up against the world.
We'll go into this further, as the subject is not something amenable to easy resolution. I hope that the FAA is aware of the issues like these.
One big issue? Allowing output from one program to run into another program as if it were equivalent to naturally-obtained data. Say what? Well, why do you think they say the software is okay but not the data/model? Supposedly, the belief in the software is much stronger than we expect. Gosh, if this is so, it needs to be deconstructed; perhaps, recent events provide the perfect opportunity for engineering to learn.
Formerly, there was a hard rule to never think that a program's output stood for nature. Especially so is this the case when dealing with the results of an application of differential equations (and the like); no matter how brilliantly close these results may appear when viewed with the newer mechanisms for visualization (yes, we'll go into that more, too), they are approximates to the real.
Too, these techniques require fiddling (think of oodles of knobs) for controlling the evolution of a solution (in this case, data or model?).
Gosh, have we begun to believe that our little virtual selves (and their artifacts) on the tubes (in cyber space or the cloud) are more real than what we are in the world (and its artifacts) in which we live? This will be very important to discuss.
The management view does not understand the subtleties of these problems. Technical fellows do a little bit more so, but they too can go astray.
There is (can be) no hubris in engineering!!!
No, folks, this was predictable from the beginning as shown by entries (see #2, #4 and more) in this blog; one main issue deals with quasi-empiricism.
First of all, in the AW article, an engineering professor is quoted as saying that Boeing did it backward. Usually, one starts small and then scales up (remember this important concept, as we'll cover it more thoroughly). That is, one enlarges from a small basis. You know, there is an adage: don't bite off more than one can chew.
The concept is applied a lot in modeling. In fact, software vendors always worry about scale up, in many ways, such as logic, throughput and more (very many ways).
The professor expressed some surprise that Boeing had extrapolated so much from a limited basis of knowledge. You see, not only were there relaxations along many axes in the product and process spaces, the program jumped to a maximum without prototyping. Why? Well, the computer was the magic key (computerism).
Now, the article says that some claim that the software involved (meaning CAE) is not suspect. No, the article says, it was the data and model that were. According to those that know, including a quoted expert.
Well, the blogger has no inside information on the particular project but speaks from experience related to this type of modeling. The software, and its underlying philosophical framework, are always to be suspect. Why? There is no grand theory to support these things to the level that we have been led to believe.
Ah, folks, it is a very un-insightful viewpoint for an engineering company to not know the limits of mathematics and software. But, the view is probably the one to be expected to be held by a gaming generation, that is until they bump up against the world.
We'll go into this further, as the subject is not something amenable to easy resolution. I hope that the FAA is aware of the issues like these.
One big issue? Allowing output from one program to run into another program as if it were equivalent to naturally-obtained data. Say what? Well, why do you think they say the software is okay but not the data/model? Supposedly, the belief in the software is much stronger than we expect. Gosh, if this is so, it needs to be deconstructed; perhaps, recent events provide the perfect opportunity for engineering to learn.
Formerly, there was a hard rule to never think that a program's output stood for nature. Especially so is this the case when dealing with the results of an application of differential equations (and the like); no matter how brilliantly close these results may appear when viewed with the newer mechanisms for visualization (yes, we'll go into that more, too), they are approximates to the real.
Too, these techniques require fiddling (think of oodles of knobs) for controlling the evolution of a solution (in this case, data or model?).
Gosh, have we begun to believe that our little virtual selves (and their artifacts) on the tubes (in cyber space or the cloud) are more real than what we are in the world (and its artifacts) in which we live? This will be very important to discuss.
The management view does not understand the subtleties of these problems. Technical fellows do a little bit more so, but they too can go astray.
There is (can be) no hubris in engineering!!!
Wednesday, July 1, 2009
Wing and body
flightblogger gave a run down on the cause of the recent 787 delay and followed up with more information. That latter begs a question of how Boeing information can be out on the web with a flightglobal mark on it (this is only one example).
If flightglobal didn't protest so much about this, one would think that there was some conduit (yes, financial metaphor - remember? off the books) in place.
The plane that you sit in is essentially a tube being pulled along by the engines. So, believe it when they say that the wing-body join is crucial. If it breaks, ... This join has a very significant role. Too, it is a very difficult thing to design. Why?
It has serious aerodynamic requirements at higher speeds, and it has to be strong enough to handle the loads (meaning more than carrying around a bunch of sitting passengers and their luggage, okay?). The design for the first set of requirements (the external look) can be analyzed prior to flight (somewhat) but is something that flight testing (and lifetime performance) validates. The second set of requirements deals with the internal structures and seems to be where the current problem is found.
The design issues of the wing-body join have caused many to tear their hairs out. Higher speeds, minimizing efforts at material and weight, the computational sirens of modern technology, and other things make the design issues very difficult to solve. We will get into part of this further.
The associated knowledge, folks, is what is called a competitive advantage and usually is proprietary. For some reason, Boeing decided to farm this baby out to others (where is the soul of this thing?). Then, they seemed to have let the oversight of this crucial piece lapse. Why?
Was it relief at getting rid of the problem? Ah, how many Boeing engineers are sick at hearing about the current state?
Well, the middle-out issues apply here; we'll discuss that, too.
Modified: 07/05/2009
If flightglobal didn't protest so much about this, one would think that there was some conduit (yes, financial metaphor - remember? off the books) in place.
The plane that you sit in is essentially a tube being pulled along by the engines. So, believe it when they say that the wing-body join is crucial. If it breaks, ... This join has a very significant role. Too, it is a very difficult thing to design. Why?
It has serious aerodynamic requirements at higher speeds, and it has to be strong enough to handle the loads (meaning more than carrying around a bunch of sitting passengers and their luggage, okay?). The design for the first set of requirements (the external look) can be analyzed prior to flight (somewhat) but is something that flight testing (and lifetime performance) validates. The second set of requirements deals with the internal structures and seems to be where the current problem is found.
The design issues of the wing-body join have caused many to tear their hairs out. Higher speeds, minimizing efforts at material and weight, the computational sirens of modern technology, and other things make the design issues very difficult to solve. We will get into part of this further.
The associated knowledge, folks, is what is called a competitive advantage and usually is proprietary. For some reason, Boeing decided to farm this baby out to others (where is the soul of this thing?). Then, they seemed to have let the oversight of this crucial piece lapse. Why?
Was it relief at getting rid of the problem? Ah, how many Boeing engineers are sick at hearing about the current state?
Well, the middle-out issues apply here; we'll discuss that, too.
Modified: 07/05/2009
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Polls and more
We'll have to do another series of polls (completions) related to Boeing being out on a limb.
flightglobal has one that is interesting running currently. Here is a summary:
Based upon the yapping of the past few years, does the new Boeing think that accomplishment is necessarily accompanied with jaw-boning (or is it trash talking?)? Is that the Boeing of fame?
flightglobal has one that is interesting running currently. Here is a summary:
- Subject: latest 787 delay ...
- temp glitch 31%
- serious problem 57%
- project is doomed 12%
Based upon the yapping of the past few years, does the new Boeing think that accomplishment is necessarily accompanied with jaw-boning (or is it trash talking?)? Is that the Boeing of fame?
Out on a limb
It seems that Boeing may be out on a limb with its 787 project with the limb cracking. We're almost two years past the 'potemkin' roll-out. That there was recently delay news (again) opens up a can of worms requiring analysis and comment.
Here are a couple of items to start a long list.
-- Announcements just prior to the recent delay news were awfully hopeful and essentially misleading (actually, can we say that they were untrue?). Where is the board? What is the disconnect that we see with Boeing's board and management? How can the board sit idly by and let this comedy of errors continue? Two years ago, a Boeing press release exclaimed that the first 787 was getting put together for the roll-out and reminded us all that the plan was to fit pieces from far away places together in just three days. That same year, management kept promising that first delivery would be May 2008 until late in the year. In fact, one manager (PR type) was talking this just a day before Boeing announced its first delay. This type of disjoint communication speaks a lot about underlying problems. Of course, many of the problems may be technically beyond the grasp of the board. But, are they making proper efforts?
-- There seems to be a disconnect between engineering and management. But, how can we know with the widely scattered team that bridges across countries and cultures? Now, the computer was ostensibly the means to bridge the disparity. But, we have already seen Boeing recognize that it has to bring some of the work back in house and more thoroughly monitor the work of partners (sub-contractors) as a means to reduce the rework. Too, the computer was used in lieu of prototyping as a cost-saving measure. Hah! Those who know realize that the physical modeling is not mature enough for this belief. Would the wise advise caution since the science of composites is so new compared to metals? How could the board allow this belief to grow to such an extent that it put Boeing out on the limb and it culminated in a sequence of misadventures that would be comical if the matter was not so serious?
These are only two of many items that will be discussed further.
But, let's be specific, please. The blog is written by someone who has worked CAD/CAE, KBE, and the like. Okay? But, he also knows that we have run off way too strongly after the sirens (yes, of mythology) of computation. That we have many of a gaming generation can be a little disconcerting. The metrics of reality are quite a bit different than that of 'virtual' reality. The 787 has to fly in the natural and not the computational world. See discussion on Truth Engineering.
flightglobal's poll shows that about 300 people think that the project is doomed. Interesting, indeed. I personally know a few who thought this back in 2005.
Remarks:
07/05/2009 -- Recent comments suggests a too strong belief in the computational.
Modified: 07/05/2009
Here are a couple of items to start a long list.
-- Announcements just prior to the recent delay news were awfully hopeful and essentially misleading (actually, can we say that they were untrue?). Where is the board? What is the disconnect that we see with Boeing's board and management? How can the board sit idly by and let this comedy of errors continue? Two years ago, a Boeing press release exclaimed that the first 787 was getting put together for the roll-out and reminded us all that the plan was to fit pieces from far away places together in just three days. That same year, management kept promising that first delivery would be May 2008 until late in the year. In fact, one manager (PR type) was talking this just a day before Boeing announced its first delay. This type of disjoint communication speaks a lot about underlying problems. Of course, many of the problems may be technically beyond the grasp of the board. But, are they making proper efforts?
-- There seems to be a disconnect between engineering and management. But, how can we know with the widely scattered team that bridges across countries and cultures? Now, the computer was ostensibly the means to bridge the disparity. But, we have already seen Boeing recognize that it has to bring some of the work back in house and more thoroughly monitor the work of partners (sub-contractors) as a means to reduce the rework. Too, the computer was used in lieu of prototyping as a cost-saving measure. Hah! Those who know realize that the physical modeling is not mature enough for this belief. Would the wise advise caution since the science of composites is so new compared to metals? How could the board allow this belief to grow to such an extent that it put Boeing out on the limb and it culminated in a sequence of misadventures that would be comical if the matter was not so serious?
These are only two of many items that will be discussed further.
But, let's be specific, please. The blog is written by someone who has worked CAD/CAE, KBE, and the like. Okay? But, he also knows that we have run off way too strongly after the sirens (yes, of mythology) of computation. That we have many of a gaming generation can be a little disconcerting. The metrics of reality are quite a bit different than that of 'virtual' reality. The 787 has to fly in the natural and not the computational world. See discussion on Truth Engineering.
flightglobal's poll shows that about 300 people think that the project is doomed. Interesting, indeed. I personally know a few who thought this back in 2005.
Remarks:
07/05/2009 -- Recent comments suggests a too strong belief in the computational.
Modified: 07/05/2009
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Here we go again
Gosh, every time Boeing managers come out with their talks of things being right on par, we need to remember this, it'll be followed with some revelation that is troublesome. Why troublesome? Well, talk is cheap, as they say. These guys, Jim M is one, ought to let the engineers speak. That has been said before.
And, where the heck is the technical fellowship? Let's see who started that? Condit? The idea is that managers talk crap by necessity. That is, just about the majority of the problems with the economy comes from people listening to these idiots.
But, what the heck are we to do? Just not listen to anyone? Well, the cynic would say yes. I say no. There are people who talk truth; many times these ones are hidden or sat on to squelch their speech.
Is it possible that the new media will overcome some of those age old dynamics, that led essentially to fat-cat-ism and the world being run thereby.
Now, the message here. Many factors are at play, but we can start with 5 that will be discussed at length with further post (and, former mentions will be linked).
Anyone think that this last problem will be it and that things will just fall into place for magical delivery? Yes indeed, hope does spring eternal goes the saying.
Coming issues:
-- we need to discuss other types of issues, such as new media's use of private information. How does this happen without recourse? Too, is new media just a pawn? ...
-- was the program too focused on proving composite technology?
Remarks:
07/05/2009 -- We can now get serious.
Modified: 07/05/2009
And, where the heck is the technical fellowship? Let's see who started that? Condit? The idea is that managers talk crap by necessity. That is, just about the majority of the problems with the economy comes from people listening to these idiots.
But, what the heck are we to do? Just not listen to anyone? Well, the cynic would say yes. I say no. There are people who talk truth; many times these ones are hidden or sat on to squelch their speech.
Is it possible that the new media will overcome some of those age old dynamics, that led essentially to fat-cat-ism and the world being run thereby.
Now, the message here. Many factors are at play, but we can start with 5 that will be discussed at length with further post (and, former mentions will be linked).
- Earned value -- it's been said before, folks, that you can't expect magic and get a product. Nor can you know a priori when something is complete. Heck, it's difficult even to know when something is complete ex post facto (see point 5 below). Now, change things along all axes in both the process and product spaces and what have you? A potentially big mess (perfect storm?).
- Parameterized model -- sheesh, the manager used this example in many telecons about the 787. Oh, it was within the parameteric bound. Is that idiotic (except he probably has advanced degrees)? One can lift out control variables as parameters, yes. But, just like non-monotonic logic has the problem of qualification so too will process control. Don't get me started about the idiocies of designs and parameters. Oh wait, I will go on about that later.
- Hype/Hypothesis -- look, managers, until you get something together and it performs, do not hype the thing. Oh, that genie was let out of the bottle long ago, alas. Needless to say, business seems to want to run itself in a mode that assumes we're all idiots. Ought things be that way (why the heck is Carson still in his position? mute the guy, please!!!).
- Misused mathematics -- just because we're in 2009 and have almost miraculous computational prowess is no excuse to assume that some age-old problems are resolved. Au contraire. But, how do we get the message across here? Well, we'll keep trying. The litany of misuses would be very long indeed if we had the energy to attempt the enumeration. Let's instead revisit the basic issues and hope that those who can will adapt whatever is required for them to perform more wisely (ah, how much mischief comes from the relenting focus on efficiency - why thanks, managers, yes it is you to whom we'll all point as the main enablers of the problems).
- Underdetermination -- oh no, what the heck does that mean? Well, did we not hear some discussion about unknown unknowns at one briefing? Was that meant in jest? Or, was it a half-hearted attempt at cheap philosophizing? In either case, any of those who work with earned value ought to consider this item, even is just briefly. Oh yes, there are other ways to express this notion; that, too, will be covered.
Anyone think that this last problem will be it and that things will just fall into place for magical delivery? Yes indeed, hope does spring eternal goes the saying.
Coming issues:
-- we need to discuss other types of issues, such as new media's use of private information. How does this happen without recourse? Too, is new media just a pawn? ...
-- was the program too focused on proving composite technology?
Remarks:
07/05/2009 -- We can now get serious.
Modified: 07/05/2009
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Class acts III
Gosh, this will take an undirected turn which is not unexpected when underdetermination is considered. Consider that we can make the 'boomers' to be the example this time (see I and II). Yes, they who turned 60 not too long ago.
Well, there are too many people to mention, but we can start to list a few.
Modified: 06/20/2009
Well, there are too many people to mention, but we can start to list a few.
- -- Miliken. Did he really believe that risk could be wished away (see item #3, what say you, silly games)?
- -- Stein. Relates to Miliken in an interesting way. Haven't read the book. May do so.
- -- A whole nameless cadre (Mike, this is here to juxtapose your take) who worked hard, helped within their community, raised their family, looked forward to the future and who were then screwed over by their government (laxity, belief - almost to the point of foolishness - in 'the' market (hah!), pure greed, ...), business (mostly stinky from the get go), and the fat cats (ah, not included with business?). To these is dedicated in part the efforts at depicting how a supposedly well-educated and smart generation went awry.
- -- Yes, the hippies of whom we can choose many an example, ..., at some later point.
- -- Those who took more than probably warranted.
- -- ...
- -- Those who apologized? Or those who did not (WSJ, 9/19/2009, "This Boomer Isn't Going To Apologize")?
- -- Any who did not let the pollution of money to undermine their excellence as human beings: Yes, rent can go to labor (new look at capitalism), and finance can have a higher calling. It's amazing that President Obama spent time in Chicago (lots of it) and did not fall into the ways of the CBOE (Buffet is now siren'ed it seems).
Modified: 06/20/2009
Wednesday, June 10, 2009
Rent seeking
Too bad, we don't see heroes (oops, wrong, see Remarks below about Michael Miliken. I'll, most likely, find more on proper search.) in finance. We get a lot of negativity with a little back-slapping (enough to bring on hubris, such as this graphic depicts).
The Economist, recently, had a special report on business in America which included some discussion of the future for the financial types that we have all come to just love so much, of late. Figure 6 above shows the big pay increase that was associated with the madness before the crash.
But, we need finance as a means to facilitate the flows of the economy (several aspects to this that will be re-addressed). But, this discipline need not think that they are it (rather, they're mechanics). Gosh, where did that type of hubris arise?
So, as an opinion in the WSJ ("There Is No Upside to a Down Economy") discusses, we have progress when people strive whether they do it in a mature way or in the adrenaline enhancing manner. Progress can be described, partly, by wealth creation which makes the game non-zero sum, yet, closer to near-zero [to be updated]. Supposedly, everyone benefits in this game.
Why near-zero? With a nod to Adam Smith, we can describe it as some partaking in 'rent seeking' which tends (it will be shown) to have the Minsky property which leads to states of undue speculation and ponzi/madoff, almost as if by necessity. There are ways to measure this, such as the efficacy of moving monies into the pockets of the few from scores of hapless.
Consider that this concept will be added to the basics on money and truth.
Remarks:
06/17/2009 -- We may not have heroes in a general sense, but we have people who are idolized (and more), such as Miliken whom we'll use as a focal point to discuss several things. Miliken, evidently, is not a fan of Modigliani's opinion. Mike says that structure counts (see WSJ article). By the way, Mike's comments on myths about him will be part of the discussion. His comment #13 makes him out almost to be stockholders' Robin Hood.
Remember, the theme here is that a lot of securitization is bunk, many times. Sheesh, talk about a perpetual motion machine, always moving monies from the pockets of the hapless to that of the fat cats. We need a fresh look.
Modified: 06/17/2009
The Economist, recently, had a special report on business in America which included some discussion of the future for the financial types that we have all come to just love so much, of late. Figure 6 above shows the big pay increase that was associated with the madness before the crash.But, we need finance as a means to facilitate the flows of the economy (several aspects to this that will be re-addressed). But, this discipline need not think that they are it (rather, they're mechanics). Gosh, where did that type of hubris arise?
So, as an opinion in the WSJ ("There Is No Upside to a Down Economy") discusses, we have progress when people strive whether they do it in a mature way or in the adrenaline enhancing manner. Progress can be described, partly, by wealth creation which makes the game non-zero sum, yet, closer to near-zero [to be updated]. Supposedly, everyone benefits in this game.
Why near-zero? With a nod to Adam Smith, we can describe it as some partaking in 'rent seeking' which tends (it will be shown) to have the Minsky property which leads to states of undue speculation and ponzi/madoff, almost as if by necessity. There are ways to measure this, such as the efficacy of moving monies into the pockets of the few from scores of hapless.
Consider that this concept will be added to the basics on money and truth.
Remarks:
06/17/2009 -- We may not have heroes in a general sense, but we have people who are idolized (and more), such as Miliken whom we'll use as a focal point to discuss several things. Miliken, evidently, is not a fan of Modigliani's opinion. Mike says that structure counts (see WSJ article). By the way, Mike's comments on myths about him will be part of the discussion. His comment #13 makes him out almost to be stockholders' Robin Hood.
Remember, the theme here is that a lot of securitization is bunk, many times. Sheesh, talk about a perpetual motion machine, always moving monies from the pockets of the hapless to that of the fat cats. We need a fresh look.
Modified: 06/17/2009
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